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ABSTRACT
This study examines the impact of multi-layer governance
mechanisms on the level of bank risk disclosure. Using a large
dataset from 14 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries
over a period of 8 years, our ﬁndings are three-fold. First, our
results suggest that the presence of a Sharia supervisory board is
positively associated with the level of risk disclosure. Second and at
the bank-level, we ﬁnd that ownership structures have a positive
eﬀect on the level of risk disclosure. At the country-level, our
evidence suggests that control of corruption has a positive eﬀect
on the level of bank risk disclosure. Our study is, therefore, a major
departure from much of the existing accounting literature that
oﬀers new crucial insights that show that ﬁrms’ disclosure choices
are not mainly shaped by ﬁrm-level (internal) governance
arrangements, but also country-level (external) governance and
religious factors. Our ﬁndings have important implications for
corporate boards, investors, regulatory authorities, standards-setters
and governments relating to the development, implementation
and enforcement of corporate and national governance standards.
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1. Introduction
The 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis has increased the importance of risk management and disclos-
ure, as well as good governance structures in the banking sector worldwide (Alnabsha,
Abdou, Ntim, & Elamer, 2018; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elmagrhi, Ntim, Elamer, &
Zhang, 2018; Ntim, 2016; Walker Review, 2009). Despite the growing importance of this
topic, studies examining the impact of ﬁrm-level governance structures on risk disclosure
are generally rare (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elshandidy,
Fraser, & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas, 2013), especially in the banking
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sector of emerging market countries, such as those in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA1) region. Speciﬁcally, the stock markets of most MENA countries (e.g. Egypt,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)) were severely
aﬀected by the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis due to their deeper links with the global stock
markets with large exposures to US/EU banks’ credit, liquidity andmarket risks. For instance,
foreign direct investment (FDI) inﬂows to MENA countries dropped from $78.5 billion in
2008 to $68.4 billion in 2009 (Neaime, 2016). Nevertheless and despite its growing impor-
tance, it is still not well understood whether multi-layer governance (MLG)2 mechanisms
(e.g. board and ownership mechanisms, the presence of a Sharia3 supervisory board (SSB),
and country-level governance mechanisms) can aﬀect the level of bank risk disclosures.
Therefore, this study examines the impact of MLGmechanisms on the level of risk disclosure
in annual reports by banks using a dataset from 14 countries in the MENA region over the
2006–2013 period. As current International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), Basel
accords (I, II, and III), and Corporate Governance (CG) reforms require banks to provide
more transparent information on their risk management, our study explores the underlying
governance determinants of risk disclosure practices across MENA countries.
Theoretically, we expect ﬁrm- and country-level governance structures to inﬂuence the
level of bank risk disclosure for a number of reasons. First,, from the standpoint of resource
dependence theory (RDT), bank boards and shareholders might increase the quality of risk
disclosure in order to obtain access to critical resources, such as ﬁnance and business con-
tracts (Jia, Ding, Li, & Wu, 2009; Jizi, Salama, Dixon, & Stratling, 2014; Ntim et al., 2013;
Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978). With a particular focus on Islamic banks, their SSBs can be a
mechanism for securing such resources and legitimising their banks’ operations and per-
formance (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Oliveira, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2011; Suchman, 1995).
Second, risk management and disclosure activities can facilitate banks towards achieving
greater internal organisational eﬃciency (Rattanataipop, 2013). However, some banks
may be able to achieve these eﬃciencies with fewer resources because they possess comp-
lementary competencies. As a result, these banks may enjoy greater opportunities for com-
petitive advantage through continual risk management and disclosure improvements
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013). Third, comprehensive risk disclosure often acts as a signal
of improved risk management and compliance to IFRS regulations and Basel Accords,
which can enhance the reputation of such banks (Ntim et al., 2013). Finally, banks are
characterised by their heavy reliance on outside resources. This dependence on external
resources makes banks exposed to both changes in the resources ﬂow and country-level
institutional pressures (Bonetti, Magnan, & Parbonetti, 2016; Rattanataipop, 2013). Thus,
1MENA refers to the Middle East and North Africa region. MENA region includes 19 countries as follows: Algeria, Bahrain,
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, UAE,
West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
2Multi-layer governance (MLG) consists of three layers of governance structures that we employ in this study. The ﬁrst layer
is the in-board layer, which attempts to capture the role and eﬀect of the Sharia supervisory board on bank risk disclos-
ures. The second layer is the bank-level governance layer, which includes board and ownership structures and how they
can aﬀect bank risk disclosures. The last layer is the role of country-level governance mechanisms (e.g. corruption and rule
of law) on bank risk disclosures.
3Sharia or Islamic law are Islamic principles derived mainly from contemporary Islamic theologic interpretations of the
Quran and the Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad (Syed & Van Buren, 2014). It should be noted that Sharia or Islamic
laws that regulate human daily interactions (e.g. ﬁnancial transactions) are not strictly well-deﬁned set of speciﬁc
rules and principles because they tend to diﬀer based on diﬀerent Islamic scholars’ interpretations in relation to contem-
porary activities (Abedifar et al., 2013; Syed & Van Buren, 2014).
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banks may choose to improve their risk disclosure level as a strategic behaviour to manip-
ulate external dependencies or exert inﬂuence over the allocation or sources of critical
resources in direct response to the country-level governance processes that aﬀect them
(Bonetti et al., 2016; Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978).
Consequently, a number of empirical studies have either investigated the impact of
individual/single governance structures on risk disclosure mainly in non-ﬁnancial insti-
tutions in comparison with ﬁnancial institutions, such as banks (Barakat & Hussainey,
2013; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). Our study seeks to depart from
much of the extant literature by focusing on banks, and in fact, is directly related to
three recent studies by Barakat and Hussainey (2013), Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) and
Ntim et al. (2013). Speciﬁcally, Ntim et al. (2013) examined the impact of ﬁrm-level gov-
ernance on risk disclosures using a sample of South African listed non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Their ﬁndings suggest a positive relationship between ﬁrm-level governance (e.g. board
size and independence) and risk disclosure. Similarly and using a sample of 105 Egyptian
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) explored the impact of ownership and
board structure on risk disclosure level. Their reported ﬁndings indicate a negative
relationship between (i) board and ownership structures (e.g. CEO duality and ownership
concentration), and risk disclosure. Additionally, Barakat and Hussainey (2013) investi-
gated the relationship between ﬁrm- and country-level governance structures (e.g.
board independence, government ownership and rule of law) and operational risk infor-
mation relating to European banks. They report a positive association among the govern-
ance structures examined and the level of operational risk disclosure. We note, however,
that whilst Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) and Ntim et al. (2013) evidence relates to non-
ﬁnancials using only ﬁrm-level governance mechanisms, Barakat and Hussainey (2013)
examined operational risks only in developed European banks. By contrast, our study
examines all the three main types of risks (ﬁnancial, operational and strategic risks)
that have been identiﬁed in banks from the MENA region, and consequently investigates
the extent to which both ﬁrm- (e.g. Sharia, board and ownership structures) and country-
level (e.g. absence of violence and control of corruption) governance mechanisms can
explain observable diﬀerences in such bank risk disclosures.
This study focuses on MENA countries because they provide a unique context to
conduct this study for a number of important reasons. First, similar to many emerging
markets, MENA countries have witnessed varied challenges in relation to their CG prac-
tices compared to their developed country counterparts. These challenges include: the
prevalence of concentrated power in the form of widespread CEO role duality, limited
board independence, and poor levels of transparency and disclosure practices (Hassan,
Romilly, Giorgioni, & Power, 2009; Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, & Stapleton, 2012).
Second, many MENA governments and regulatory authorities have pursued a consider-
able number of reforms in the area of CG, including the implementation of IFRS and
Basel accords (e.g. I, II and III), which require banks to report more information about
their risk management practices. Third, the MENA banking sector has experienced a
phenomenal growth in the numbers of Islamic (IBs) and dual (DBs)4 banks in recent
times (Mollaha & Zaman, 2015). However, whilst this growth is generally viewed as a
4Dual banks oﬀer (i) conventional ﬁnancial products and services and (ii) those services that comply with Sharia law and
principles, which seek to meet the needs of people and companies with Islamic religious concerns.
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positive development, it can also create additional agency, governance and management
challenges, as IBs and DBs tend to have two distinct internal CG structures. These
consist of the traditional board of directors, who are expected to focus on taking conven-
tional decisions on the one hand, and an Islamic governance committee/SSB, which tends
to focus on ensuring that the products and services of their banks are in compliance with
Sharia or Islamic law, on the other hand (Mollaha & Zaman, 2015; Saﬁeddine, 2009).
However, to-date, few studies have examined the eﬀect of Islamic governance commit-
tee/SSB on bank risk disclosures.
Finally, the MENA region includes some of the rapidly growing countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), which have recently attracted a lot of publicity and invest-
ments, especially with the liberalisation of their stock markets (e.g. UAE) (Neaime,
2016). At the same time, the banking sector in the MENA region is distinctly characterised
by the presence of concentrated ownership structures (e.g. family ownership and govern-
ment ownership) (Hassan et al., 2009; Neaime, 2016; Samaha et al., 2012), and thus oﬀers
an interesting context to investigate the eﬀectiveness of risk disclosure and ownership
structures. We, therefore, seek to extend the extant literature by considering how owner-
ship concentration and ownership type aﬀect risk disclosures.
Against this background, the central objective of this study is to examine the impact of
MLG on the level of risk disclosure by MENA banks. Speciﬁcally, we investigate the
impact of ownership, SSB and country-level governance characteristics on the level of
risk disclosure in MENA banks (e.g. IBs, commercial banks, and DBs). In doing so,
we extend, as well as make a number of new contributions to the extant literature.
First and drawing insights from a RDT perspective, we provide evidence relating to
the inﬂuence of SSB on the level of bank risk disclosures. The extant research suggests
that Shariah boards play a signiﬁcant role in monitoring bank’s ﬁnancial reporting
quality (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook, Kabir Hassan, & Lanis, 2011; Saﬁeddine,
2009). We expand this nascent research by oﬀering evidence that SSB can serve as an
additional governance layer with ability to thoroughly monitor and scrutinise managerial
decisions, including those relating to disclosures. We argue that by highlighting the SSB
role in connecting the bank to its external environment in order to secure important
resources, our ﬁnding may help inform the decisions of the various stakeholders of
banks, such as employees, depositors, investors, government and regulators. Second,
our ﬁndings show that ownership structures are among the most important channels
through which corporate governance may inﬂuence risk disclosure level. Third, and to
the best of our knowledge, our study oﬀers a fresh evidence on the eﬀect of country-
level factors on the level of risk disclosure. This result may potentially help investors
and regulators to better understand and/or evaluate the channels through which
macro-level factors, such as country governance aﬀect disclosure level. Finally, we
extend the existing literature by examining whether the type of bank ownership moder-
ates the relationship between multi-layer governance mechanisms and risk disclosure in
MENA countries.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses risk disclosure
practices, CG reforms, the role of Sharia supervisory board (SSB) and Islamic governance
in a MENA context. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework for risk disclosure.
Section 4 reviews the literature onMLG and risk disclosure. Section 5 outlines the research
design. Section 6 discusses the empirical ﬁndings. Section 7 concludes.
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2. Risk management, CG disclosure reforms and Sharia supervisory boards
in MENA
2.1. Risk disclosure in banks
The 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis has highlighted the importance of risk management and
disclosure in the banking sector worldwide. Indeed, the past decade has witnessed the
global ﬁnancial crisis, a credit crunch, a European debt crisis, and several high proﬁle cor-
porate failures, including the demise of large global banks (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013;
Elamer, AlHares, Ntim, & Benyazid, 2018; Ntim et al., 2013; Ozturk, 2014). These failures
occurred in the banking sector as banks were exposed to various types of risk. Although
risk is a key issue in banking operations, there are two approaches to deﬁning it (Ale, 2009;
GASB, 2000). The ﬁrst approach tends to concentrate on the negative eﬀects of risk,
including potential losses, negative impact, hazards, damages and/or threats (Ale, 2009;
GASB, 2000). By contrast, a second approach focuses on a combination of the upside
(favourable), and downside (unfavourable) of risks (IRM, 2002, COSO, 2004, ISO,
2009, IAS 32 and 39, IFRS 7). This study follows the second approach that deﬁnes risk
as uncertainty, volatility, and exposure aﬀecting the deviation from an expected
outcome, which may result in potential gains or losses. In this way, our approach is com-
prehensive and reﬂects more accurately the multi-faceted nature of risk within banking
operations and the broader business environment. In spite of the importance of risk man-
agement and disclosure to corporate operations, including banks and, especially during
periods of economic and ﬁnancial crises, there is no comprehensive ﬁnancial reporting
standard that currently covers all types of risks.
Banks are exposed to various types of risk when providing their ﬁnancial services. The
common types of risk (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elamer, Ntim, & Abdou, 2017; Ntim
et al., 2013), which are considered in this study include ﬁnancial risks (e.g. credit risk,
liquidity risk, market risks, capital management and adequacy risks), and non-ﬁnancial
risks (e.g. operational risks; and strategic risks). The Basel accords have outlined three
main types of risks, which are: (i) credit, (ii) market, and (iii) operational risks; to
which banks have an obligation to reserve adequate capital resources (i.e. regulatory
capital) in order to absorb any unexpected losses. The International Accounting Standard
(IAS) 32, IFRS 7 and IFRS 9 also provide a classiﬁcation of risks and framework for dis-
closure, especially ﬁnancial risks. A major limitation of these accounting standards is that
they concentrate only on ﬁnancial risks, which include credit, liquidity, market and deriva-
tive/ﬁnancial instruments trading risks. In fact, neither Basel I, II and III nor IAS 32, IFRS
7 and IFRS 9 deal suﬃciently with operational (e.g. technology and integrity risks) and
strategic risks (e.g. inﬂation and interest rates risks) (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS,
2006).
Meanwhile many experts and scholars still see the requirements of the Basel capital
accords (Basel I, II and III) and IFRS (IAS 32, IFRS7 and IFRS 9), as being very general
and qualitative in nature, although considered as an important step towards enhancing
risk disclosure in banks (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ford, Sundmacher, Finch, &
Carlin, 2009). Thus, the occurrence of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007/08 and the associated
credit crunch, it was shown that the capital regulation of Basel II might be insuﬃcient
to strengthen the banking sector’s transparency. Therefore, there was a need to develop
a new or revised framework (Mittoo & Varotto, 2011) to promote greater resilience
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within the banking sector. Consequently in 2009, the Basel committee started to reﬁne its
Basel II accord, leading to the publication of the Basel III accord in 2010 with the aim of
enhancing the resilience of banks in order to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb
shocks arising from ﬁnancial and economic stress. In addition, Basel III raised both the
quality and quantity of the regulatory capital base and enhanced the risk coverage of
the capital framework by strengthening the regulation, supervision, governance and risk
management of the banking sector (BCBS, 2011; Rattanataipop, 2013; Walker, 2011).
Walker (2011) has argued for the continuous improvement in risk management and dis-
closure practices, which is underpinned by good governance in order to reduce the like-
lihood of future ﬁnancial crisis. Consequently, many emerging markets, including those
in the MENA region, have embarked on reforms that are aimed at enhancing their risk
management, CG structures and disclosure practices that are strongly informed by
these international standards and reforms.
2.2. CG and disclosure reforms in MENA
Arab countries in the MENA region have signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of income per
capita levels, legal systems and stages of economic development and reforms (Samaha
et al., 2012). Moreover, MENA countries, similar to many emerging market economies,
face a number of challenges with respect to their CG practices compared to their devel-
oped counterparts. For instance, the MENA banking sectors are characterised by either
majority family-owned banks (FOBs) or government-owned banks (GOBs), often with
signiﬁcant governance challenges. These include weak CG structures like CEO role
dual, limited board independence, concentrated ownership structures, and poor transpar-
ency and disclosure practices (Baydoun, Maguire, Ryan, & Willett, 2012; Samaha et al.,
2012). Moreover, banks have legal, ethical, and moral obligations to mitigate their risks
in order to protect their shareholders, as well as their other stakeholders, and improve
their performance because of the complexity and opaqueness of the banks’ operations
and their related exposures and risks (Falikhatun, Aryani, and Prabowo, 2010). Therefore,
sound CG practices can be a way to increase transparency and legitimize their activities
(Cheng & Courtenay, 2006).
Meanwhile CG structures in MENA countries have witnessed substantial changes
over the past decades. In order to improve the integrity of local markets and attract
foreign investors, governance practices have been aligned the relevant international
standards. In this case, Oman was the ﬁrst country in the MENA region to issue a
code of CG in 2002, relating to companies listed on the Muscat securities market
(Baydoun et al., 2012). Also, CG guidelines for UAE bank directors were issued in
June 2006, and a code of CG was issued in 2007 for joint-stock companies (Hassan,
2009; Muzahem, 2011). Similarly, a code of CG was introduced in Saudi Arabia in
2006 (Baydoun et al., 2012). In Jordan, further to issuing the bank of directors’ handbook
of CG in 2004, its Central Bank also issued a CG code in 2007. Egypt published its ﬁrst
code for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private sector organisations in 2006.
Appendix A1 presents the main corporate governance codes/guidelines changes in
MENA countries.
In addition to the above reforms, MENA countries have a privileged geographic
location, which covers four of the essential and international trade routes (i.e. Bab-el-
ACCOUNTING FORUM 251
Mandeb, Gibraltar, Hormuz, and Suez) (Bitar, Saad, & Benlemlih, 2016). The strategic
geographic location of MENA countries also makes them susceptible to social, economic
and political instability. However, it is ex ante ambiguous whether MLG play a greater or
lesser role in countries with social, political and economic turmoil (e.g. Bahrain, Egypt and
Tunisia). Our study endeavours to shed some new insights on these issues, and thus may
yield distinctive implications.
Furthermore, the MENA context is characterised by rapid growth of Islamic banking,
which face additional risks and CG challenges. In particular, international ﬁnancial insti-
tutions are increasingly becoming interested in Islamic ﬁnance and investment due to the
large global growth in Islamic ﬁnance and banking worldwide. For instance, the amount of
Islamic ﬁnance in 2011 totalled approximately $1.3 trillion in assets and an annual
expected growth rate between 10% and 20% per year (Ernst & Young, 2012). Also, a
2012 report by Ernst and Young (2012) suggests that the growth of Islamic ﬁnance has
continued at a steady pace, suggesting an average annual growth of 19% over the 2009–
2011 period. Moreover, several major international banks (e.g. BNP Paribas, Citibank,
Deutsche Bank, and HSBC) have established Islamic windows to meet the increasing
demand for Islamic products (Ozturk, 2014). In the last decade, Islamic banking has trans-
formed itself from a trivial ﬁnancial experiment to a major player in the global banking
sector in MENA countries. For example, MENA Islamic banking represent about 70%
of the global Islamic banking system assets (Ernst & Young, 2016). Prior research
(Farooq & Zaheer, 2015; Hasan & Dridi, 2010) suggests that the rapid development of
the Islamic ﬁnancial sector is accompanied by assertions about the relative resilience of
Islamic banking to ﬁnancial crises in comparison with conventional banking. For instance,
Islamic ﬁnance experienced less deposit withdrawals, better capitalisation, higher asset
growth, and relatively better stock market performance than conventional banks. Thus,
this study seeks to examine the impact of CG in IBs in comparison with CBs, which
can oﬀer some beneﬁts to regulatory authorities.
Meanwhile, the need for compliance with Sharia principles in the MENA region can
also create unique CG challenges. The need to ensure compliance with Sharia principles
diﬀerentiates an Islamic ﬁnancial institution from its non-Islamic counterparts in its pro-
ducts, instruments, operations, practices, and management from traditional ﬁnancial
institution. As Islamic banks need to comply with Sharia principles, Islamic governance
is considered as the backbone of Islamic banking and ﬁnance. It legitimises the practices
of banking and ﬁnancial institutions, and increases the conﬁdence of the shareholders, as
well as the public through ensuring that all practices and products are in compliance with
Sharia rules. On the other hand, the existence of Sharia risk (Non-Sharia compliant
manner) would not just aﬀect the conﬁdence of the shareholders and the public in
Islamic banking and ﬁnance institutions, but might also expose Islamic banking to
similar ﬁnancial crises often faced by conventional banks (e.g. ﬁduciary and reputational
risks). Most interestingly, surveys, such as those conducted by Chapra and Ahmed (2002)
in Bahraini and Sudanese Islamic banks show that most depositors (86% and 95% in Bah-
raini and Sudanese Islamic banks) of Islamic banks are prepared to withdraw their funds if
those banks fail to operate in a Sharia compliant manner (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Saﬁed-
dine, 2009). Thus and due to the religious features of Islamic banks, Sharia risk arguably
emerges as an additional operational risk in terms of the risk of Sharia non-compliance
(Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013; Izhar & Asutay, 2010; Van Greuning & Iqbal,
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2007). Thus, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) deﬁnes operational risk in Islamic
banks as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and
system, or from external events, which includes, but is not limited to, legal risk and Sharia
non-compliance risk” (IFSB, 2005, p. 26). Given this background, the main aim of this
study is to measure the level of risk disclosure in MENA banks and ascertain the extent
to which MLG mechanisms, including SSB, can explain observable diﬀerences in such
risk disclosures.
3. Resource dependence theoretical framework
Resource dependence theory (RDT) explains how organisations decrease external interde-
pendence and uncertainty (Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978). RDT suggests that organisations are
open systems, which are not independent due to their reliance on the external environ-
ment to acquire and secure critical resources that they require (Durand & Jourdan,
2012; Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978). Organisations, such as banks must manage their risks
in order to gain a steady supply of critical resources, such as ﬁnancial capital, deposits
and legitimacy to reinforce their existence and their ability to grow sustainably in the
longer term. Organisations are both supported and constrained by their external environ-
ments (Garud, Kumaraswamy, & Karnøe, 2010). Hence, thriving organisations need to
improve their ways of operations in order to successfully deal with their external environ-
mental needs and to gain the support of the main resource owners (Pfeﬀer & Salancik,
1978).
Of direct relevance, regulators are promoting IFRS and Basel accords adoption because
they believe that risk management and disclosure practices can help banks to increase their
operational eﬃciencies, performance and mitigate severe future ﬁnancial crises. Thus, risk
management and disclosure activities can create opportunities to gain competitive advan-
tage (Hart, 1995). At the most basic level, risk management and disclosure practices can
help banks to ensure that their management practices conform to IFRS regulations and
Basel accords. However, the risk management and disclosure practices can also facilitate
the implementation of measures that can prevent/mitigate risks. As a result, some
banks may no longer be subject to some costly regulatory mandates. Further, risk manage-
ment and disclosure practices can assist banks to scrutinise their internal operations,
involve employees in risk management issues, continually monitor their progress, and
enhance their knowledge about their operations. All of these actions can also help
banks to improve their internal operations, achieve greater eﬃciencies, and create oppor-
tunities for achieving their strategic objectives.
RDT can be extended to consider the role of risk disclosure, as a signal of improved risk
management and compliance to IFRS regulations and Basel accords, and hence, reputation
in those ﬁelds because disclosure impacts the external perception of a bank’s reputation. It
will be diﬃcult for banks investing in risk management and disclosure activities to create
positive reputation to realise the value of such reputation without making related disclos-
ures (Ntim et al., 2013). In addition, bank boards and shareholders might increase the
quality of risk disclosure in order to obtain access to critical resources, such as ﬁnance
and business contracts (Jia et al., 2009; Jizi et al., 2014; Ntim et al., 2013; Pfeﬀer & Salancik,
1978). With a particular focus on Islamic banks, their SSBs can be a mechanism for secur-
ing such resources and legitimising their operations and performance (Drees & Heugens,
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2013; Oliveira et al., 2011; Suchman, 1995). Moreover, risk management and disclosure
activities can assist banks in achieving greater organisational eﬃciency (Rattanataipop,
2013). However, some banks may achieve these eﬃciencies with fewer resources
because they possess complementary competencies. As a result, these banks may enjoy
greater opportunities for competitive advantage through continual risk management
and disclosure improvement (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013).
Based on the above theoretical viewpoint, RDT suggests that bank management might
use risk disclosure, as an instrument to support the bank’s legitimacy and reputation, and
thereby sustaining the ﬂow of critical resources with diﬀerent stakeholders, and eventually
maintaining their survival and growth (Oliveira et al., 2011). Therefore, we suggest and
test a number of hypotheses by concentrating on the extent to which diﬀerent types of gov-
ernance structures aﬀect risk disclosure of MENA banks.
4. Empirical literature and hypotheses development
Whilst a considerable number of studies have examined the impact of general ﬁrm charac-
teristics, such as ﬁrm size on the level of risk disclosure (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012;
Mokhtar &Mellett, 2013; Rajab & Handley-Schachler, 2009), few studies have investigated
the impact of governance variables on risk disclosure (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Elshandidy
et al., 2013; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Muzahem, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013). In addition, a
limited number of studies have examined the power of SSBs’ to monitor banks’ CG/
CSR disclosure and performance (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Grassa,
2016; Rahman & Bukair, 2013), as well as how country-level governance factors, such
as the rule of law aﬀect risk disclosures (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013). Following these pre-
vious studies, this study seeks to explore how bank- and country-level governance mech-
anisms in the form of Islamic governance/SSB characteristics, ownership mechanisms (i.e.
governmental and family ownership) and country-level governance (i.e. political strength
and lack of violence/terrorism and control of corruption) drive the level of bank risk
disclosures.
4.1. Islamic governance/SSB and risk disclosure
Islamic governance/(SSB) seeks to ensure that all practices and activities of banks (e.g. pro-
ducts, instruments, operations, practices, and management) are in compliance with Sharia
principles and rules at all times, especially with respect to RIBA (interest) and speculative
behaviour (Farook et al., 2011; Kamla & Alsouﬁ, 2015; Riaz, Burton, & Monk, 2017;
Saﬁeddine, 2009). Theoretically, the unique problems faced by Islamic ﬁnancial insti-
tutions like “Mudarabah” (proﬁt-sharing) can increase adverse selection and moral
hazard problems. This can exacerbate agency problems by increasing opportunities for
managerial expropriation of bank resources (Kamla, Gallhofer, & Haslam, 2006; Saﬁed-
dine, 2009). Therefore, RDT suggests that the SSB may be able to oﬀer better access to
a banks’ external environment in order to enhance opportunities for securing vital
resources, such as ﬁnance and business contracts (Jia et al., 2009; Jizi et al., 2014;
Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978).
In accordance to the above view, Islamic governance structure (SSB) and its particular
members are considered as border spanners acquiring crucial resources (e.g. knowledge,
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contacts, networks) to ensure the survival of a bank (Pfeﬀer, 1972). This goes in contrast to
the control and monitoring role emphasis that arises from the principal-agent puzzle
(Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). RDT suggests that SSBs have a further role in con-
necting the bank to its external environment in order to secure important resources
(Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978). SSB members’ knowledge and expertise are important for
their ability to oﬀer the required advice and insights to support management in giving
reliable decisions. For example, Al-Bassam and Ntim (2017), Farook et al. (2011), and
Rahman and Bukair (2013) argue that SSB with extensive and more varied expertise
and knowledge, including ﬁnancial expertise, may be more motivated to push for true,
fair and transparent disclosures, including those relating to inherent risks; in order to
relay this information not only to shareholders, but also to other stakeholders, and
thereby legitimising the banks’ practices.
Empirically, limited, but a gradually growing number of studies have suggested that SSB
can be a key governance mechanism that may be able to enhance disclosure quality and
performance (Farook et al., 2011; Mollaha & Zaman, 2015; Rahman & Bukair, 2013).
For instance, Farook et al. (2011), and Rahman and Bukair (2013) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant posi-
tive association between SSB characteristics and the level of CSR disclosure. Al-Bassam
and Ntim (2017) also ﬁnd a positive relation between SSB characteristics and the level
of voluntary CG disclosure in Saudi listed ﬁrms. In addition, Mollaha and Zaman
(2015) ﬁnd a positive relation between the intensity of Sharia board supervision and
bank performance. By contrast, Saﬁeddine (2009) ﬁnds deﬁciencies in Sharia governance
practices. For instance, the study found that the establishment of a governance committee
or an audit committee was not common among the banks that they surveyed. Therefore,
the ﬁnancial reporting process has a limitation that could increase agency problems.
Whilst some research has been carried out on Islamic governance/ SSB characteristics
and voluntary disclosure (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017), to the best of our knowledge, no
prior study has examined the relationship between SSB characteristics and the level of
risk disclosure. In summary, we expect that the formation of SSB can establish an obser-
vable relationship between banks and external resource providers that may ultimately have
a positive eﬀect on risk management and disclosure practices. Therefore, the study’s ﬁrst
hypothesis is that:
H1: There is a positive association between Islamic governance and MENA banks’ risk
disclosures.
4.2. Corporate governance: bank ownership mechanisms
Ownership structure can have an impact on attitudes to governance and risk disclosure
(Beattie, Fearnley, & Brandt, 2001; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Ntim, Opong, &
Danbolt, 2015). The directors (insiders) prepare the annual report for shareholders (out-
siders) and thus, ownership might play a vital role in the extent to which risk disclosure
occurs (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). For
instance, RDT suggests that major shareholders of banks (e.g. government and family
shareholders) may put pressure on managers to disclose more transparent information
relating to risk in order to secure access to critical resources, such as funds and customers
(Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978). Speciﬁcally, drawing on RDT, we
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hypothesise that banks, which depend heavily on government or/and family funding will
be more keen to make crucial eﬀorts to conform to new rules and make sure that their
ﬁnancial reporting is up to a high standard.
Empirically, Alhazaimeh, Palaniappan, and Almsaﬁr (2014), Eng and Mak (2003),
Ghazali (2007), Ntim et al. (2013), and Ntim and Oseit (2011) report a positive association
between government ownership and risk disclosure. In contrast, Barakat and Hussainey
(2013), and Naser, Al-Khatib, and Karbhari (2002) have reported no such association,
whilst Dam and Scholtens (2012) ﬁnd a negative association between government owner-
ship and voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Chau and Gray (2010), Chen and Jaggi (2001),
Chen, Chen, and Cheng (2008), and Haniﬀa and Cooke (2002) ﬁnd negative relation
between family shareholding and disclosure, whilst Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan
(2007), Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino, and Sansone (2010), Chen et al. (2008), Wan-
Hussin (2009), and Wang (2006) ﬁnd a positive relationship between family shareholding
and disclosure quality. Notably, to the best of our knowledge, no prior research has exam-
ined the relation between family ownership and risk disclosure. Therefore, the study’s
second hypothesis is that:
H2: There is a positive relationship between ownership structure (i.e., government and family
shareholdings) and MENA banks’ risk disclosures.
4.3. Country-level governance
Country-level governance is likely to play a crucial role in shaping risk disclosure level for
a number of reasons (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Essen, Engelen, & Carney, 2013; Kaufmann,
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). First, a country’s governance arrangements guide bank incen-
tives to disclose risk information that reﬂects the underlying risk management and econ-
omic performance (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Leuz,
Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Second, bank managers under the scrutiny of eﬀective
country-level governance are expected to employ the intrinsic ﬂexibility oﬀered by corpor-
ate governance codes and accounting standards to communicate higher level of risk infor-
mation in order to reduce information asymmetry that can help in gaining more external
resources (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010). Finally, banks are characterised by their
heavy reliance on outside resources. This dependence on external resources makes banks
exposed to both changes in the ﬂow of resources and country–level institutional pressures.
Thus, banks may choose to improve their risk disclosure level, as a strategic move towards
inﬂuencing external dependencies or exerting inﬂuence over the allocation or sources of
critical resources in response to the country-level governance processes that aﬀect them
(Bonetti et al., 2016; Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978).
For example, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 2000) suggest that
country-level governance in terms of legal rules, and their enforcement quality presented
to investors in a country is vital for the development of its ﬁnancial markets and may
enhance investors protection and eﬀectiveness of governance structures (e.g. corporate
governance, external ﬁnance type, and disclosure quality). In a country, where governance
arrangements protect investors and they are thoroughly enforced, investors are prepared
to provide capital to banks, increasing the liquidity and the value of capital markets.
Bonetti et al. (2016) and Leuz et al. (2003) ﬁnd that country-level governance quality
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stimulates ﬁrms’ disclosure practices. They argue that strong protection provided by
country-level governance structures can restrain the ability of managers to acquire self-
beneﬁts of control that can reduce their motivations for opaque disclosure. Thus, banks
that operate in countries with powerful governance institutions will be more keen to
make signiﬁcant eﬀorts to adapt to new rules and regulations in addition to making
sure that their ﬁnancial disclosures are up to a high standard in order to secure the
ﬂow of critical resources. For instance, banks may choose to engage in increased risk dis-
closure in order to signal their superior performance to outside stakeholders. Conse-
quently, a number of past research has reported results that support these expectations
by showing that country-level governance quality (e.g. investor protection, extent of
legal enforcement, and capital market characteristics) shapes ﬁrm disclosure incentives
and explains diﬀerences in disclosure practices across countries (Bonetti et al., 2016; Burg-
stahler et al., 2006; Cumming, Hou, & Wu, 2014; DeFond, Hung, & Trezevant, 2007).
Empirically, the extant research reports a positive relationship between country-level
governance and performance and/or disclosure (e.g. Cumming et al., 2014; Essen et al.,
2013; Shen, Huang, & Hasan, 2012). For instance, Cumming et al. (2014) explore the
impact of country-level governance on foreign cross-listed ﬁrms’ valuation. Using a
sample of 1,334 non-US companies from 48 countries over the period 1996–2008,
Cumming et al. (2014) report that foreign cross-listed companies’ valuation is contingent
on home country governance. Speciﬁcally, this study reports that the valuation of cross-
listed companies to be higher if those companies are cross-listed and/or from strongly gov-
erned environments compare to those companies that are non-cross-listed and/or from
weakly governed environments. Similarly, using a sample of 1,005 foreign cross-listed
companies in the US from forty countries between 1996 and 2005, Shi, Magnan, and
Kim (2012) report that home country governance and ownership structures have a posi-
tive relationship with foreign cross-listed ﬁrms’ disclosure level. In addition, Beltratti and
Stulz (2012), and Barakat and Hussainey (2013) ﬁnd a positive, but statistically insigniﬁ-
cant relationship between country governance indicators and performance and/or risk dis-
closure. This leads to the study’s ﬁnal hypothesis, which is as follows:
H3: There is a positive association between country governance indicators and MENA banks’
risk disclosures.
5. Research design
5.1. Sample and data considerations
Our sample is selected from all listed commercial and Islamic banks in the MENA region
with full data over eight ﬁscal years: 2006–2013. The total sample covers 100 banks listed
in 14 MENA stock exchanges. This represents over 95% of the total market capitalisation
of all the listed banks. We selected the period (2006–2013) for a number of reasons. First,
our sample spans the 2007/2008 banking crisis period. Second, we begin with 2006 as the
Basel accord became applicable in the MENA region frommid-2005. Third, we excluded a
number of countries (i.e. Algeria, Iran, Libya, Mauritania, and Yemen) due to lack of data
availability or language barriers. Speciﬁcally, some countries (e.g. Algeria) publish disclos-
ures in French and we could not understand such disclosures. Finally, data is not available
for a majority of our sample prior to year 2006. Board characteristics, ownership structure,
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risk disclosure and ﬁnancial data was collected from the sampled banks’ annual reports
(downloaded from the Perfect Information Database and bank websites), and the Bank-
scope database. Country-level macro-economic and governance variables are collected
from the IMF world outlook and theWorld Bank’s worldwide governance indicators data-
bases, respectively. The ﬁnal sample consists of 752 bank-year observations. The sample
construction is presented in Table 1.
5.2. Deﬁnition of variables and model speciﬁcation
We classify our variables into six main categories, as presented in Table 2 with their full
deﬁnitions. First, our dependent variable is risk disclosure level (RDI). We developed and
measured risk disclosure as follows. First, we identiﬁed a number of risk disclosure
measures and scoring approach on the basis of the empirical work carried out by a
large number of past studies (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013;
Ntim et al., 2013; Savvides & Savvidou, 2012). Second, we identiﬁed some of the items
from the relevant international and banking standards and regulations (i.e. IAS 32,
IFRS 7, IFRS 9), and the Basel Accords (I, II, and III)). Finally, we supplemented these pro-
visions further by ﬁrst reading a sample of annual reports from each country to identify
the “typical” risk disclosures that have been made in the past. We then put items obtained
from these three major sources to form the detailed dimensions of our overall risk disclos-
ure index. Thus, our risk disclosure index contains both voluntary and mandatory disclos-
ures for which we have now indicated in the index.
Hence, we make use of a comprehensive RDI measure that takes into consideration a
range of important risks across banks and six principal constructs that reﬂect detailed
dimensions of the overall RDI measure (Ntim et al., 2013). These six constituents are:
(i) ﬁnancial risks, consisting of credit, liquidity, market, and capital risks, (ii) operational
risks, and (iii) strategic risks, making a total 96 items. Appendix A2 displays the deﬁnitions
and scoring procedure of all 96 items included in the RDI. This study uses a self-con-
structed risk disclosure index (RDI) to measure risk disclosure level presented in Appen-
dix A2. Prior studies follow two approaches when it comes to measuring risk disclosures.
On the one hand, some prior studies (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015)
Table 1. Sample construction.
Country Total banks Banks selected IBs obs CBs obs DBs obs Full sample percentage
Bahrain 11 11 44 16 24 84 11.17%
Egypt 11 11 13 40 20 73 9.71%
Jordan 12 12 13 75 3 91 12.10%
Iraq 9 2 0 16 0 16 2.13%
Kuwait 12 10 36 35 5 76 10.11%
Lebanon 6 6 0 28 16 44 5.85%
Morocco 4 1 0 0 8 8 1.06%
Oman 6 5 0 34 5 39 5.19%
Palestine 3 1 0 8 0 8 1.06%
Qatar 8 8 24 11 28 63 8.38%
Saudi Arabia 12 11 21 0 63 84 11.17%
Syria 9 2 6 8 0 14 1.86%
Tunisia 10 2 0 9 0 9 1.20%
UAE 19 18 32 39 72 143 19.02%
Total 132 100 189 319 244 752 100.00%
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mainly rely on predeﬁned words or sentences that reﬂect risk in annual reports. However,
there has been little agreement to date on what set of predeﬁned words can be employed to
consistently identify, and fairly reﬂect information of all risk categories in banks. Also,
there will be disclosure score bias if a bank concentrates on a certain category of risk
and provides detailed information on it while failing to disclose other risk categories
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013). On the other hand, other prior studies (Barakat & Hussai-
ney, 2013; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Savvides & Savvidou, 2012) rely on
a constructed index to measure the level of risk disclosure; which fairly captures the com-
parative weights of diﬀerent risk categories. As a consequence of these restrictions, we use
Table 2. Summary of deﬁnitions and operationalisation of variables.
Variables Deﬁnitions and coding.
Panel A: Dependent variables (risk disclosure).
RDI Is the overall risk disclosure score determined depending on the un-weighted risk disclosure index and scoring
criteria clariﬁed in Appendix, comprising of 96 sub-items, which fairly capture the comparative weights of
diﬀerent risk categories.
For the un-weighted risk disclosure index, each of the 96 items has a score ranging from 0 to 1 (i.e. 0 – risk item
not disclosed by a bank; 1 – risk item disclosed by a bank). This un-weighted scoring procedure can result in a
total potential score of 96; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%.
For the weighted risk disclosure index, each of the 96 items has a score ranging from 0 to 2 (i.e. 0 – risk item not
disclosed by a bank; 1 – risk item disclosed by a bank and contains past, future, good, bad and/or qualitative
information; 2 – risk item disclosed by a bank and contains past, future, good, bad, qualitative and/or
quantitative information). This weighted scoring procedure can result in a total potential score of 192; scaled
to a value between 0% and 100%. These RDI items and the scoring procedure are contained in the Appendix.
Panel B: Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB).
SSB Is the total SSB characteristics score determined according to the un-weighted SSB index consisting of 7
provisions and scoring criteria are; SSB Existence = 1, if a bank has SSB board, 0 otherwise.; SSB Report = 1, if a
bank has disclosed SSB report, 0 otherwise; Number of Member = 1, if a bank has disclosed number of SSB’s
member, 0 otherwise; SSB Meetings = 1, if a bank has disclosed number of SSB meetings, 0 otherwise; SSB
Experience = 1, if a bank has disclosed number of SSB experience, 0 otherwise; Independent = 1, if SSB’s
members are independent from management, 0 otherwise; Total fees disclosed = 1, if a bank discloses SSB
fees/ compensation, 0 otherwise. This un-weighted scoring procedure can result in a total potential score of
7; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%.
Panel C: Corporate governance (CG) ownership characteristics.
GOWN Percentage of governmental ownership with at least 5% to total bank ordinary shareholdings.
FOWN Percentage of family ownership with at least 5% to the total bank ordinary shareholdings.
Panel D: Corporate governance (CG) board characteristics.
BS Number of directors in BODs.
DUAL 1, if the bank CEO and chairperson positions are held by same person, 0 otherwise.
NEDS Percentage of non-executive directors to the total number of the bank BODs.
Panel E: Country level governance variables.
PS Country- level political strength and absence of violence/ terrorism score based on Kaufmann et al. (2010)
which calculates the probability of the government to threatened by violent or illegal means, containing
politically-inspired terrorism and violence in years 2006 until 2013. A higher score means better political
strength and absence of violence/ terrorism.
CC Country- level corruption governor score based on _ENREF_86 Kaufmann et al. (2010) which calculates the
level to which abuse of bestowed public power to acquire a private beneﬁt. A higher score means better
control of corruption.
Panel F: Control variables.
LNTA Bank size measure by natural log of total assets.
ROA Performance which measure by return on assets which are percentage of net income to total asset.
LIQ Liquidity which is net loans to total assets.
COST Operations eﬃciency which are percentage of cost to income.
CAR The capital adequacy ratio.
LENG Number of bank annual report pages.
CRIS Financial crisis period
INFL Inﬂation, which are consumer prices (annual %).
GDP GDP per capita (current US$).
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the index approach in coding our RDI. However, the index measurement method is also
regularly criticised for being characteristically subjective (Marston & Shrives, 1991).
Therefore, to lessen subjectivity, we followed these steps. First, two independent research-
ers coded a sample of 20 annual reports individually and their outcomes were compared.
No signiﬁcant diﬀerences emerged, with high coeﬃcient of agreement (0.829), which is
greater than the acceptable level in the social sciences discipline (reliability threshold
ranges from 0.70 to 0.80) (Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004; Marston & Shrives,
1991). Second, a single coder (the main coder) completed the coding of the remainder
of the RDI afterwards. Third, the main coder re-coded a sample of ten annual reports ran-
domly, and the ﬁndings were compared with his earlier original coding ﬁndings. Evi-
dently, no major diﬀerences occurred, with high coeﬃcient of agreement (0.947).
Finally, we employed Cronbach’s alpha to evaluate the internal consistency of the RDI.
The Cronbach’s alpha was satisfactorily high at 84 percent; noting that the acceptable
threshold level for Cronbach’s alpha is 70% (Elamer et al., 2018). Additionally, we
created an alternative measure that directly measures the quality of risk disclosure. Speciﬁ-
cally, we used a weighted index that aimed to measure the quality of risk disclosure. For
the weighted risk disclosure index, each of the 96 items has a score ranging from 0 to 2 (i.e.
0 – risk item not disclosed by a bank; 1 – risk item disclosed by a bank and contains past,
future, good, bad and/or qualitative information; 2 – risk item disclosed by a bank and
contains past, future, good, bad, qualitative and/or quantitative information). This
weighted scoring procedure can result in a total potential score of 192; scaled to a value
between 0% and 100%. These RDI items and the scoring procedure are contained in
Appendix A2.
Second, to examine H1 to H3, we have gathered data on multi-layer governance mech-
anisms. For instance, the presence of an SSB is used as a proxy for Islamic governance. It
includes seven dimensions of the SSB’s best practices, covering extensive areas of Islamic
governance principles. The full items are included in Table 2. The SSB aims to measure the
level to which banks willingly and evidently integrate Islamic governance principles into
their operations, and consequently disclose them in their annual reports. We designated
these provisions based on three criteria. First, we performed a wide search of the prior
research that explores governance from an Islamic perspective and obtained SSB quality
variables used in those studies (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Elghuweel, Ntim, Opong, &
Avison 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Rahman & Bukair, 2013; Saﬁeddine, 2009). Second,
we obtained appropriate SSB provisions included in the Accounting and Auditing Organ-
ization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) standard on independence of Shariah
supervisory board. Finally, we complemented these provisions with SSB variables that
were acknowledged in an earlier survey of a sample of the sampled banks’ annual reports.
Ownership structure variables include government ownership (GOWN) and family
ownership (FOWN). Country-level governance variables include political strength and
lack of violence/ terrorism (PS), and control of corruption (CC). Finally, to address
issues relating to potential omitted correlated variables, we include a number of ﬁrm-
and country-level control variables. The ﬁrm-level controls include, board structure vari-
ables namely; board size (BS), CEO duality (DUAL), and percentage of non-executive
directors (NEDs). Other ﬁrm non-governance variables included as bank-level controls
are bank size (LNTA), performance (ROA), liquidity (LIQ), operations eﬃciency
(COST), capital adequacy (CAR), ﬁnancial crisis (CRIS) and the length of the annual
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report (LENG). Finally, the country-level controls include inﬂation (INFL), and GDP per
capita (GDP). Due to space limitations, we did not develop direct theoretical and empirical
links between these control variables and risk disclosure, but there are extensive prior
empirical studies that suggest that they can impact on the level of bank risk disclosures
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Cabedo
& Tirado, 2004; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Mokhtar & Mellett,
2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Savvides & Savvidou, 2012).
Following Elshandidy and Neri (2015) and Ntim et al. (2013), we use ﬁxed-eﬀects
regression model to examine the impact of MLG (SSB, board structure, ownership struc-
ture, and country-level governance) on the level of risk disclosure. We chose ﬁxed-eﬀects
regression model rather than random-eﬀects regression model because of the Hausman
test results indicated that it is more appropriate to do so. Therefore, our main regression
model is identiﬁed as follows:
RDIit = a0 + bi
∑8
i=1
MLGit +
∑9
i=1
biCONTROLSit + dit + 1it (1)
where,
RDI refers to risk disclosure index;MLG refers to multi-layer governance, consisting of
the SSB, ownership structures (FOWN and GOWN); and country-level governance,
including absence of violence (PS), and control of corruption (CC). CONTROLS refer to
ﬁrm-level control variables, including board structures (BS, DUAL, and NEDs), non-gov-
ernance variables (LNTA, ROA, LIQ, COST, CAR, CRIS and LENG), and country-level
control variables (INFL and GDP). dit refers to the bank ﬁxed-eﬀects and year ﬁxed-
eﬀects, 1it refers to the error term, a0 refers to the intercept, and bi refers to the
vectors of coeﬃcient estimates.
6. Findings and discussion
6.1. Descriptive, univariate and bivariate analyses
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the un-weighted and weighted risk disclosure
indices5 (RDI and W-RDI, respectively) and SSB, and each of the eight ﬁrm years inves-
tigated. Table 3 reveals a number of interesting ﬁndings. First, it shows that there is a high
degree of variation in the risk disclosures between banks. For instance, RDI ranges from a
minimum of 1 (1.04%) to a maximum of 84 (87.5%) with a standard deviation of 17.04,
indicating a signiﬁcant level of discretion regarding risk disclosure quality in the annual
reports. The results (untabulated) indicate that banks provide more disclosures about
capital risks (89.90%). This is followed by credit risks (69.04%) and strategic risks
(55.36%). By contrast, market risks are the least disclosed type (48.30%). Within the
MENA region, Kuwaiti banks, on average, are seen to disclose risks signiﬁcantly more
5For the un-weighted risk disclosure index, each of the 96 items has a score ranging from 0 to 1 (i.e. 0 – risk item not
disclosed by a bank; 1 – risk item disclosed by a bank). This un-weighted scoring procedure can result in a total potential
score of 96; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. For the weighted risk disclosure index, each of the 96 items has a
score ranging from 0 to 2 (i.e. 0 – risk item not disclosed by a bank; 1 – risk item disclosed by a bank and contains past,
future, good, bad and/or qualitative information; and 2 – risk item disclosed by a bank and contains past, future, good,
bad, qualitative and/or quantitative information). This weighted scoring procedure can result in a total potential score of
192; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. These RDI items and the scoring procedure are contained in Appendix A2.
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(64.88%) than banks in the other countries followed by Saudi banks (64.81%) and Oman
(62.79%). These results reﬂect a commitment to IFRS and Basel accords regulation and
requirements (Farook et al., 2011). By contrast, Iraqi banks provides the lowest level of
risk disclosure in the region. Second, and consistent with prior risk disclosure studies
(Ntim et al., 2013; Rajab & Handley-Schachler, 2009), there has been a continuous
increase in risk disclosure over time. For instance, the average bank disclosed 35.95
(37.45%), 47.77 (51.84%), 54.55 (56.82%), 57.44 (59.83), 61.24 (63.79%), 61.55
(64.11%), 62.51 (65.11%), and 63.60 (66.25%) of the items in the disclosure index score
(percentage) – in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively. Also,
similar consistent trends are observable with respect to the weighted disclosure index
score and the SSB, demonstrating that the 2007/08 global ﬁnancial crisis has changed
the focus of risk disclosure and SSB in MENA banks.
Finally, the banks signiﬁcantly increased disclosures about risks during the 2007/08
ﬁnancial crisis compared to the pre-2007/08 period and there was a general increasing
trend in risk disclosure behaviour over time after the 2007/08 ﬁnancial crisis. This increase
was more observable after 2009. For example, the average bank scored 35.95 (37.45%) in
2006 compared with 7.77 (51.84%), 54.55 (56.82%), 57.44 (59.83), 61.24 (63.79%), 61.55
(64.11%), 62.51 (65.11%), and 63.60 (66.25%) in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012
and 2013, respectively. These results shed light on the importance of risk disclosure for
management and stakeholders, especially after Basel II made such risk disclosure compul-
sory in most of the sampled countries after the 2007/08 ﬁnancial crisis.
Table 4 shows the summary descriptive statistics of all the other independent and
control variables included in our analysis. In general Table 4 shows a wide spread in
the distribution of all the variables. For example, GOWN ranges from a minimum of
0.00% to a maximum of 89.06% with governments holding an average of 15.51% owner-
ship in the typical MENA bank. FOWN ranges from 0.00% to 87.00%, suggesting that
despite the recommendations by the World Bank and OECD regarding the need for
greater dispersion in ownership structure, the ownership structure of MENA banks are
Table 3. Summary descriptive statistics for RDI and SSB indices for all 752 bank years.
All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
The un-weighted risk disclosure index (RDI) (%)
Mean 57.06 37.45 51.84 56.82 59.83 63.79 64.11 65.11 66.25
Median 62.50 37.50 55.21 60.42 63.54 65.63 65.63 66.67 67.71
STD 17.04 14.15 16.39 16.17 16.03 10.88 11.02 11.14 10.05
Min 1.04 6.25 6.25 1.04 7.29 26.04 25.00 19.79 19.79
Max 87.50 80.21 83.33 83.33 83.33 83.33 81.25 87.50 87.50
The weighted risk disclosure index (W-RDI) (%)
Mean 41.64 23.43 36.45 40.74 42.74 45.89 46.15 47.13 47.74
Median 44.79 21.88 39.58 43.75 45.57 46.61 47.92 48.44 48.44
STD 12.58 10.53 13.01 12.56 12.84 7.91 7.81 8.07 7.54
Min 1.04 3.65 3.65 1.04 3.65 14.58 14.06 9.90 9.90
Max 70.31 55.21 66.67 66.67 67.71 65.63 61.46 70.31 70.31
SSB index
Mean 1.43 1.00 1.17 1.25 1.51 1.51 1.45 1.51 1.67
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
STD 1.87 1.60 1.77 1.81 1.94 1.96 1.94 2.01 2.12
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 7.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
Notes: This Table reports descriptive statistics of levels of compliance with un-weighted risk disclosure index (RDI),
weighted risk disclosure index (W-RDI), and Sharia supervisory board index (SSB) from 2006 to 2013.
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still fairly concentrated. A majority of the banks in our sample are proﬁtable with a mean
proﬁtability ratio of 2%. Table 4 also shows that 80% of the banks in our sample separate
the roles of CEO and chairman, and 89% of bank boards are made up of non-executive
directors, which is consistent with the recommendations of CG codes in MENA countries.
The BS ranges from 5 to 15 directors with a mean of 9 directors. Finally, the values of
MLG, as well as the control variables, as shown in Table 4, suggest wide variability in
our sample, and thereby minimising any possibilities of sample selection bias.
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in our regression analysis
to test for multicollinearity. We report both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s
non-parametric coeﬃcients for robust results, and, noticeably, the magnitude and direc-
tion of both coeﬃcients are similar. The values indicate that no serious non-normality
problems exist. As expected, RDI quality scores are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated
with the following control variables: LNTA, LIQ, LENG, GOWN, FOWN, NEDS, SSB, PS,
CC, andGDP. By contrast, RDI is negatively and signiﬁcantly associated with the following
control variables: COST, DUAL, and INFL. These ﬁndings oﬀer support for the validity of
our disclosure index.
6.2. Regression analyses
Table 6 reports the results of the ﬁxed-eﬀects regression analysis of the impact of MLG on
the level of bank risk disclosures, namely: (i) Islamic governance (SSB); (ii) bank-level gov-
ernance (i.e. ownership structures); and (iii) country-level governance (e.g. absence of vio-
lence and control of corruption). Table 6 further summarises the results of the regression
analysis for seven diﬀerent models. First, the models are statistically signiﬁcant and explain
41%, 55%, 25%, 43%, 56%, and 50% of the variations in the level of bank risk disclosures.
Table 4. Summary descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables for all 752
observations.
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Panel A: Independent (Corporate governance (CG)/ ownership characteristics variables).
GOWN (%) 752.00 15.51 6.25 20.85 0.00 89.06
FOWN (%) 752.00 7.74 0.00 14.23 0.00 87.00
Panel B: Independent (Country Level-governance variables)
PS 744.00 −0.13 −0.31 0.93 −2.83 1.22
CC 744.00 0.23 0.24 0.70 −1.58 1.72
Panel C: Control variables
BS 752.00 9.44 9.00 1.90 5.00 15.00
DUAL 750.00 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00
NEDS (%) 752.00 89.31 90.90 18.42 0.00 100.00
LNTA 752.00 15.63 15.65 1.60 0.30 21.09
ROA 752.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 −0.52 0.24
LIQ (%) 751.00 51.60 54.76 16.57 0.00 85.37
COST (%) 745.00 42.36 39.39 30.51 −365.63 284.00
CAR (%) 707.00 20.25 17.24 14.39 9.26 204.41
LENG 750.00 99.22 91.50 48.62 8.00 324.00
INFL 736.00 5.39 4.00 4.93 −10.10 53.20
GDP 732.00 23426.34 19250.90 23200.92 5.00 93714.10
Notes: Variables are deﬁned as follows: government ownership (GOWN), family ownership (FOWN), board size (BS), CEO
duality (DUAL), percentage of non-executives directors (NEDS), political strength and absence of violence/ terrorism
(PS), corruption control (CC), bank size (LNTA), performance (ROA), liquidity (LIQ), operations eﬃciency (COST), capital ade-
quacy (CAP), annual reports length (LENG), inﬂation (INFL), and GDP per capita (GDP). Table 2 fully deﬁnes all the variables
used.
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Table 5. Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation matrices of the variables for all 752 observations.
Variable RDI LNTA ROA LIQ COST CAR LENG GOWN FOWN BS DUAL NEDS SSB PS CC INFL GDP
RDI 0.50** −0.07 0.37** −0.12** −0.13** 0.47** 0.27** 0.06 0.06 −0.16** 0.25** 0.11** 0.24** 0.30** −0.36** 0.16**
LNTA 0.55** 0.00 0.25** −0.18** −0.11** 0.31** 0.33** −0.01 0.10** −0.01 0.13** 0.18** 0.24** 0.20** −0.21** 0.22**
ROA −0.03 0.05 0.08* −0.23** 0.09* −0.10** 0.04 0.03 0.03 −0.02 −0.04 −0.12** 0.11** 0.08* 0.03 0.11**
LIQ 0.33** 0.28** 0.20** −0.17** −0.19** −0.07 0.31** −0.01 −0.13** −0.27** 0.24** 0.04 0.64** 0.60** −0.14** 0.32**
COST −0.23** −0.41** −0.45** −0.34** 0.16** 0.04 −0.13** −0.02 −0.02 0.08* −0.08* 0.03 −0.20** −0.14** 0.04 −0.23**
CAR −0.06 −0.06 0.13** 0.01 −0.12** −0.17** 0.02 −0.09* −0.17** 0.02 −0.12** 0.10** 0.01 0.02 −0.08* 0.00
LENG 0.53** 0.33** −0.19** −0.03 0.10** −0.21** 0.02 0.04 0.28** 0.13** 0.14** 0.12** −0.21** −0.13** −0.21** −0.19**
GOWN 0.30** 0.35** 0.14** 0.39** −0.24** 0.13** 0.03 −0.19** 0.01 −0.17** 0.11** 0.09* 0.28** 0.32** −0.14** 0.13**
FOWN 0.12** 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.05 −0.08* 0.14** −0.13** −0.01 −0.12** 0.00 −0.08* −0.08* −0.08* 0.01 −0.14**
BS 0.07 0.09* −0.02 −0.14** 0.05 −0.19** 0.29** 0.04 0.09* 0.13** 0.02 −0.06 −0.22** −0.18** 0.00 −0.21**
DUAL −0.16** −0.04 −0.09* −0.28** 0.09* −0.04 0.08* −0.18** −0.11** 0.14** −0.45** −0.19** −0.20** −0.21** 0.12** 0.02
NEDS 0.14** 0.04 0.02 0.32** −0.07 −0.03 0.09* 0.15** −0.03 −0.05 −0.47** 0.12** 0.20** 0.18** −0.16** 0.04
SSB 0.13** 0.35** 0.00 0.10** −0.09* 0.07 0.15** 0.12** −0.12** −0.05 −0.21** 0.07* 0.04 0.12** −0.21** 0.15**
PS 0.18** 0.25** 0.24** 0.62** −0.41** 0.12** −0.15** 0.31** −0.12** −0.25** −0.19** 0.31** 0.11** 0.77** −0.17** 0.57**
CC 0.20** 0.15** 0.22** 0.54** −0.36** 0.17** −0.08* 0.31** −0.13** −0.21** −0.19** 0.26** 0.15** 0.74** −0.23** 0.52**
INFL −0.34** −0.20** 0.01 −0.20** 0.07 −0.25** −0.23** −0.19** −0.04 0.04 0.18** −0.19** −0.25** −0.22** −0.27** 0.02
GDP 0.23** 0.33** 0.22** 0.37** −0.34** 0.02 −0.08* 0.18** −0.18** −0.20** −0.08* 0.18** 0.30** 0.52** 0.45** −0.03
Notes: The upper right half of the Table shows Pearson’s parametric correlation coeﬃcients, whereas the bottom left half of the Table contains Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coeﬃcients.
**, and * denote correlation is signiﬁcant at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). Variables are deﬁned as follows: risk disclosure quality score (RDI), bank size (LNTA), performance
(ROA), liquidity (LIQ), operations eﬃciency (COST), capital adequacy (CAP),annual reports length (LENG), government ownership (GOWN), family ownership (FOWN), board size (BS), CEO duality
(DUAL), percentage of non-executives directors (NEDS), Sharia supervisory board (SSB), political strength and absence of violence/ terrorism (PS), corruption control (CC), inﬂation (INFL), and GDP
per capita (GDP). Table 2 fully deﬁnes all the variables used.
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Second and in general, our results suggest that MLG is signiﬁcant in explaining diﬀer-
ences in risk disclosure quality. Third, and speciﬁcally, we start by investigating whether
the SSB can have an eﬀect on the level of bank risk disclosures (RDI). The coeﬃcient of the
SSB on the RDI in Model 1 of Table 6 is statistically signiﬁcant and positive, indicating that
H1 is accepted empirically. The policy suggestion is that banks that have an SSB may put
pressure on bank management to engage in increased levels of risk disclosures, as a signal
of their monitoring power and eﬀectiveness in achieving Sharia compliance. Theoretically,
Table 6. The impact of multi-layers governance on bank risk disclosure (RDI).
Variables
Dependent variable: Bank’s un-weighted risk disclosure (RDI)
(1) Full sample (2) IBs (3) CBs (4) DBs (5) GMM (6) 3SLS (7) G2SLS
Panel A: Independent: Multi-layers governance variables
Lagged RDI 17.43***
(0.000)
SSB 3.04***
(0.002)
3.74***
(0.000)
4.65***
(0.000)
6.71***
(0.000)
3.07***
(0.002)
3.06***
(0.002)
GOWN 2.58**
(0.011)
−0.66
(0.510)
0.14
(0.886)
2.15**
(0.031)
3.41***
(0.001)
3.07***
(0.002)
1.91*
(0.064)
FOWN 2.26**
(0.024)
2.61**
(0.012)
2.36**
(0.019)
−1.49
(0.139)
0.64
(0.524)
3.51***
(0.000)
3.04***
(0.002)
PS −1.70
(0.089)
0.58
(0.561)
−1.71*
(0.089)
−1.94*
(0.053)
−2.81***
(0.006)
−4.20***
(0.000)
−2.07**
(0.038)
CC 3.32***
(0.001)
2.53**
(0.012)
0.94
(0.348)
0.17
(0.863)
4.47***
(0.000)
2.18**
(0.030)
4.39***
(0.000)
Panel B: Control variables
Intercept −0.04
(0.965)
0.33
(0.742)
−2.13**
(0.034)
−3.57***
(0.000)
−3.52***
(0.001)
−1.17
(0.241)
−1.02
(0.309)
BS 1.99**
(0.047)
0.77
(0.440)
1.94*
(0.054)
3.31***
(0.001)
1.70*
(0.091)
2.59***
(0.009)
1.06
(0.290)
DUAL −1.80*
(0.072)
−1.63
(0.104)
−0.13
(0.897)
−0.06
(0.955)
−2.12**
(0.037)
−3.69***
(0.000)
−0.15
(0.879)
NEDS 2.98***
(0.003)
2.55**
(0.012)
0.19
(0.850)
2.42**
(0.023)
2.54**
(0.013)
1.33
(0.185)
2.53**
(0.011)
LNTA 5.13***
(0.000)
−0.20
(0.842)
3.14***
(0.002)
5.15***
(0.000)
1.98*
(0.051)
4.92***
(0.000)
2.34**
(0.019)
ROA −0.48
(0.631)
−0.78
(0.437)
0.72
(0.470)
4.27***
(0.000)
3.54***
(0.001)
0.33
(0.745)
0.00
(0.997)
LIQ 1.79*
(0.074)
0.55
(0.586)
0.53
(0.599)
1.74*
(0.084)
5.21***
(0.000)
5.26***
(0.000)
3.03***
(0.002)
COST −1.48
(0.139)
−2.46**
(0.015)
0.03
(0.979)
−1.34
(0.181)
−2.47**
(0.015)
−3.13***
(0.002)
−1.77*
(0.077)
CAR −1.89*
(0.059)
0.34
(0.735)
−1.89*
(0.060)
−0.95
(0.342)
−1.95*
(0.054)
−0.40
(0.691)
−1.26
(0.208)
LENG 8.99***
(0.000)
6.52***
(0.000)
3.08***
(0.002)
4.60***
(0.000)
4.84***
(0.000)
9.19***
(0.000)
9.12***
(0.000)
INFL 2.34**
(0.019)
0.53
(0.596)
1.30
(0.195)
2.10**
(0.037)
7.80***
(0.000)
2.86***
(0.004)
1.35
(0.177)
GDP −0.89
(0.374)
−1.20
(0.232)
−0.30
(0.766)
−1.22
(0.222)
−1.95*
(0.054)
−4.48***
(0.000)
−0.29
(0.774)
CRIS 5.27***
(0.000)
4.71***
(0.000)
3.68***
(0.000)
6.83***
(0.000)
6.51***
(0.000)
4.31***
(0.000)
5.49***
(0.000)
Fixed eﬀect Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
F- value(χ2) 68.88*** 29.88*** 20.32*** 37.45*** 906.51*** 866.90*** 1125.19***
Overall R2 0.4126 0.5506 0.2526 0.4272 0.5597 0.5049
No. of obs 682 183 263 236 594 682 682
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and *mean signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are
deﬁned as follows: risk disclosure quality score (RDI), Sharia supervisory board (SSB), government ownership (GOWN),
family ownership (FOWN), board size (BS), CEO duality (DUAL), percentage of non-executives directors (NEDS), political
strength and absence of violence/ terrorism (PS), corruption control (CC), bank size (LNTA), performance (ROA), liquidity
(LIQ), operations eﬃciency (COST), capital adequacy (CAP),annual reports length (LENG), inﬂation (INFL), GDP per capita
(GDP), and crisis (CRIS). Table 2 fully deﬁnes all the variables used.
ACCOUNTING FORUM 265
the results are consistent with the expectations of our RDT framework. This result implies
that engaging in good SSB practices can enhance bank legitimacy (e.g. reputation and
image) by improving the transparency of risk information that is disclosed (e.g. market,
operational, and strategic risks). The result also indicates that complying with good SSB
practices through greater risk disclosure activities can not only increase the legitimacy a
bank (Mollaha & Zaman, 2015; Suchman, 1995), but also present opportunities to
obtain important resources (Ntim et al., 2013; Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978). In addition,
our results also oﬀer empirical support for the ﬁndings of the few prior studies that
suggest that SSB can have a positive eﬀect on disclosure and performance (Farook
et al., 2011; Mollaha & Zaman, 2015; Rahman & Bukair, 2013).
Fourth, at the bank-level, we investigate whether ownership structures can have an
impact on the RDI. Ownership structures include two ownership (governmental owner-
ship – GOWN, and family ownership – FOWN) variables, respectively (Model 1 of
Table 6). The results show that governmental ownership (GOWN), and family ownership
(FOWN) are positively associated with the RDI. Similarly, the results also oﬀer support for
our RDT framework. For instance, the positive relationship among governmental owner-
ship (GOWN), family ownership (FOWN), and the RDI is in line with the ﬁndings of prior
studies (Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Ali et al., 2007; Cascino et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2008; Eng
& Mak, 2003; Ghazali, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Oseit, 2011; Wan-Hussin, 2009;
Wang, 2006). This result implies that powerful shareholders (i.e. family and government
shareholders) have both the power and the incentives to monitor insiders’ behaviour to
safeguard minority rights and bank reputation (Cascino et al., 2010). Additionally, these
results suggest that banks may engage in increased risk disclosures in order to signal
their compliance with government initiatives and standards that can enable them to
gain access to important resources, such as ﬁnance and business contracts. This, therefore,
leads us to accept H2, which suggests that there is a positive relationship between owner-
ship concentration and MENA banks’ risk disclosures.
Fifth, at the country-level, we examine whether country-level governance mechanisms
((i.e. control of corruption (CC) and political stability and absence of violence (PS)) can
have an impact on the RDI. The coeﬃcient of the control of corruption (CC) on the
RDI in Model 1 of Table 6 is statistically signiﬁcant and positive, whilst political stability
and absence of violence (PS) have a negative, but insigniﬁcant association with the level of
bank risk disclosures. The policy suggestion is that banks might be driven by institutional
pressures (i.e. CC), especially in better-governed countries to engage in increased risk dis-
closures. Theoretically, the results are consistent with the expectations of our RDT frame-
work. This result implies that better country-level governance in terms of control of
corruption may enhance investor protection, as well as improves governance eﬀectiveness,
and thereby impact positively on the RDI. In addition, our results are consistent with those
of the few prior studies that suggest that country-level governance mechanisms can have a
positive eﬀect on risk disclosure and performance (e.g. Cumming et al., 2014; Essen et al.,
2013; Shen et al., 2012). Hence, our results suggest that country-level governance in terms
of control of corruption (CC) may play a complementary governance role in reinforcing
CG–risk disclosure nexus, especially in better-governed environments. In contrast, in
poorly-governed environments in terms of political stability and absence of violence
(PS), ﬁrm-level governance plays a stronger bonding governance role to mitigate increased
agency costs in such environments in order to gain legitimacy.
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Finally and with regard to the other control variables, we found that LNTA, LIQ, and
LENG are statistically signiﬁcant and positively related to risk disclosure, implying that
MENA banks with high LNTA, LIQ, and LENG are more likely to make more signiﬁcant
risk disclosures. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Elshandidy et al. (2013), Elzahar and
Hussainey (2012), Ntim et al. (2013), and Oliveira et al. (2011). In contrast, we ﬁnd a nega-
tive, but insigniﬁcant relation between ROA, COST, CAR and GDP, and risk disclosure.
6.3. Additional analyses
We conduct a number of additional tests to ascertain the robustness of our results. First,
our sample consists of Islamic banks, commercial banks, and dual banks. Therefore, to
ascertain how MLG operates among the three categories, we re-ran equation (1) by sep-
arating the sample into three sub-samples: (i) Islamic banks (IBs); (ii) commercial banks
(CBs); and (iii) dual banks (DBs). The results relating to Models 2, 3, and 4 (RDI) are
reported in Table 6 and those relating to Models 2, 3, and 4 (W-RDI) are reported in
Table 7, respectively. These results are principally similar with slight diﬀerences in the sig-
niﬁcance levels, as reﬂected in the magnitude of the coeﬃcients’. Nevertheless, there is a
negative impact of GOWN on risk disclosure, although this relation is statistically
insigniﬁcant in IBs. Also, the results show that FOWN and CC have stronger impact
with respect to IBs compared with CBs and DBs. Finally, the BS has stronger impact
with respect to DBs compared with CBs and IBs. This may be because dual banks tend
to be bigger, have more lines of business and activities, and have larger boards, which
may increase diversity in terms of expertise and knowledge, which can also aﬀect the
level of risk disclosure.
Second, our sample covered the 2006–2013 period. Therefore, in order to ascertain how
MLG systems operated during the GFC, we include a dummy variable (CRIS) to measure
the impact of GFC period (i.e. 2007 & 2008). The results relating to CRIS contained in
Table 6 show that the coeﬃcient on CRIS is positive, indicating that GFC period had a
positive impact on risk disclosures made by MENA banks. Third, we test the robustness
of our results by re-regressing equation (1) using weighted RDI (W-RDI) as an alternative
risk disclosure index. The results, reported in Table 7, are to great extent similar to those
results reported in Table 6 with slight sensitivity in the variables’ levels of signiﬁcance.
Therefore, these ﬁndings indicate that our results are robust whether the RDI is an un-
weighted or weighted index.
Fourth, and to test for the presence of any potential endogeneity problems, which are
argued to be a common problem in CG studies (Elamer & Benyazid, 2018; Elshandidy &
Neri, 2015; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Mollaha & Zaman, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim &
Soobaroyen, 2013), we conducted the following three diﬀerent tests. First, we employed
three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimations (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Zellner & Theil,
1962). The 3SLS methodology consists of three steps. First, MLG instruments are gener-
ated by using the predicted parts from the ﬁrst-stage. Speciﬁcally, we conjecture that MLG
variables (i.e. SSB, BS, DUAL, NEDs, FOWN, and GOWN) will be determined by all the
control (exogenous) variables speciﬁed in equation (1). Second, covariance matrices for
MLG instrumental values based on the residuals are estimated. Third, generalised least
square regression is conducted by using the covariance matrices estimated in the
second stage (Dennis & Taisier, 2014; Mollaha & Zaman, 2015). Therefore, our 3SLS
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model is identiﬁed as follows:
RDIit = a0 + bˆi
∑8
i=1
MLGit +
∑9
i=1
biCONTROLSit + dit + 1it (2)
where,
Table 7. The impact of multi-layers governance on bank risk disclosure (W-RDI).
Variables Dependent variable: Bank’s weighted risk disclosure (W-RDI)
(1) Full sample (2) IBs (3) CBs (4) DBs (5) GMM (6) 3SLS (7) G2SLS
Panel A: Independent : Multi-layers governance variables
Lagged W-RDI 22.64***
(0.000)
SSB 4.54***
(0.000)
3.61***
(0.002)
5.48***
(0.000)
4.96***
(0.000)
2.84***
(0.005)
2.74***
(0.006)
GOWN 0.01
(0.996)
−0.75
(0.457)
0.17
(0.865)
0.90
(0.367)
4.13***
(0.000)
3.36***
(0.001)
1.59
(0.113)
FOWN 1.69*
(0.093)
1.50
(0.135)
1.75*
(0.082)
−1.48
(0.140)
1.76*
(0.082)
2.99***
(0.003)
2.44**
(0.015)
PS −2.21**
(0.027)
0.16
(0.874)
−1.68*
(0.095)
−3.05***
(0.003)
−0.68
(0.498)
−4.29***
(0.000)
−2.41**
(0.016)
CC 3.29***
(0.001)
1.22
(0.224)
1.50
(0.134)
−0.49
(0.628)
2.79***
(0.006)
2.28**
(0.022)
4.74***
(0.000)
Panel B: Control variables
Intercept −0.59
(0.556)
0.16
(0.871)
−1.38
(0.171)
−4.34***
(0.000)
6.11***
(0.000)
−1.71*
(0.087)
−1.84*
(0.066)
BS 2.06**
(0.040)
0.66
(0.512)
2.07**
(0.039)
3.47***
(0.001)
1.42
(0.160)
2.76***
(0.006)
4.09***
(0.000)
DUAL −2.39**
(0.017)
−1.64
(0.104)
−0.97
(0.335)
−0.54
(0.593)
−2.05**
(0.043)
−2.80***
(0.005)
−0.79
(0.432)
NEDS 2.95***
(0.003)
2.24**
(0.027)
1.01
(0.313)
0.25
(0.802)
4.32***
(0.000)
1.40
(0.162)
2.60***
(0.009)
LNTA 4.69***
(0.000)
−0.23
(0.819)
1.74*
(0.084)
5.49***
(0.000)
2.22**
(0.029)
4.33***
(0.000)
2.38**
(0.017)
ROA −0.51
(0.612)
−1.01
(0.314)
0.44
(0.662)
4.45***
(0.000)
−2.22**
(0.029)
−0.54
(0.591)
−0.17
(0.866)
LIQ 1.77*
(0.078)
0.66
(0.512)
0.14
(0.886)
1.91*
(0.058)
5.41***
(0.000)
4.74***
(0.000)
3.07***
(0.002)
COST −1.83*
(0.068)
−2.55**
(0.012)
−0.20
(0.843)
1.40
(0.162)
−0.67
(0.506)
−3.29***
(0.001)
−1.90*
(0.058)
CAR −1.91*
(0.056)
0.19
(0.850)
−2.64***
(0.009)
−0.68
(0.498)
−1.66
(0.100)
−0.22
(0.822)
−1.03
(0.303)
LENG 7.33***
(0.000)
5.62***
(0.000)
2.52**
(0.013)
2.82***
(0.005)
4.36***
(0.000)
6.76***
(0.000)
7.06***
(0.000)
INFL 4.17***
(0.000)
1.52
(0.132)
2.27**
(0.024)
3.04***
(0.003)
8.11***
(0.000)
2.00**
(0.046)
2.95***
(0.003)
GDP −1.81*
(0.070)
−1.67*
(0.097)
−0.14
(0.892)
−2.05**
(0.041)
−0.28
(0.782)
−4.63***
(0.000)
−0.14
(0.889)
CRIS 7.62***
(0.000)
5.96***
(0.000)
8.16***
(0.000)
4.89***
(0.000)
7.32***
(0.000)
6.36***
(0.000)
7.85***
(0.000)
Fixed eﬀect Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
F- value (χ2) 70.06*** 26.75*** 20.44*** 38.76*** 602.93*** 784.71*** 1108.80***
Overall R2 0.3462 0.5112 0.2089 0.2820 0.5350 0.4737
No. of obs 682 183 263 236 594 682 682
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and *mean signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are
deﬁned as follows: risk disclosure quality score (RDI), Sharia supervisory board (SSB),government ownership (GOWN),
family ownership (FOWN), board size (BS), CEO duality (DUAL), percentage of non-executives directors (NEDS), political
strength and absence of violence/ terrorism (PS), corruption control (CC), bank size (LNTA), performance (ROA), liquidity
(LIQ), operations eﬃciency (COST), capital adequacy (CAP),annual reports length (LENG), inﬂation (INFL), GDP per capita
(GDP), and crisis (CRIS). Table 2 fully deﬁnes all the variables used.
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Everything else remains unchanged as identiﬁed in equation (1) except that, we use the
covariance matrices from the second step estimation as instruments for the eight MLG
variables. The results are reported under Model 6 of Table 6. These results are mostly
similar to those reported under Model 1 of Table 6, suggesting that our results are
robust to possible endogeneity problems that may arise from omitted factors. The
minor increase in the coeﬃcients’ of the MLG variables in Model 6 of Table 6 compared
to those under Model 1 of Table 6 are in line with previous studies, which indicate that
instrumented variables of MLG variables are likely to predict risk disclosure more power-
fully than their un-instrumented variables (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). Secondly, we use
G2SLS (generalised two-stage-least-squares ﬁxed-eﬀects within estimator) to re-estimate
our results (Baltagi & Deng, 2015). The results reported under Model 7 of Table 6 are
to a great extent similar to those reported under Model 1 of Table 6 and those in
Model 1 of Table 7, suggesting that our results are robust to possible endogeneity
problems.
Finally, to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity between RDI and the inde-
pendent variables, we re-estimate our ﬁndings by using a dynamic panel GMM estimator
following Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) in the corporate governance domain. It deals
with the endogeneity problem in a number of ways. First, it aims to eliminate or signiﬁ-
cantly alleviate most of the endogeneity problems that may create links between our risk
disclosure index and many un-observed bank characteristics. Second, this approach also
improves the issue of regular inherent changes in the RDI indices over time (e.g. Ntim,
Lindop, Osei, & Thomas, 2015; Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012).
More speciﬁcally, the GMM approach can eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity,
which can force a spurious correlation between our explanatory variables (MLG) and
past values of our dependent variable (RDI). Finally, the GMM approach is robust to auto-
correlation and heteroscedasticity between present and historical values. Speciﬁcally, it
uses historical values of the dependent and independent variables as eﬀective instruments
to appropriately control the existence of potential simultaneous and dynamic endogene-
ities. Thus, we estimate a dynamic two-step GMM estimator to control for the two-way
causality. This unique estimator has the capacity to suﬃciently account for the presence
of several sources of endogeneities, including those that may be due to unobservable
bank-speciﬁc factors, heterogeneity, dynamic endogenous regressors, possible omitted
variables bias, heteroscedasticity and simultaneity by allowing all the explanatory variables
(i.e. the MLG and all control variables) to be considered as endogenous (e.g. Arellano &
Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012; Wooldridge,
2010). We estimate a GMM model as follows:
RDIit = a1 + k1RDIit−1 + bXit + gZit + dit + 1it (3)
where,
RDI refers to a proxy of risk disclosure level for bank i during year t. Xit denotes all
explanatory variables (MLG) that include Sharia supervisory board (SSB), board size
(BS), CEO duality (DUAL), percentage of non-executive directors (NEDs), government
ownership (GOWN), family ownership (FOWN), political strength and lack of violence/
terrorism (PS), and control of corruption (CC). Zit includes bank size (LNTA), perform-
ance (ROA), liquidity (LIQ), operations eﬃciency (COST), capital adequacy (CAR), the
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length of the annual report (LENG), inﬂation (INFL), and GDP per capita (GDP). dit refers
to the unobserved bank-year speciﬁc ﬁxed-eﬀects, and 1it refers to the error term.
The GMM system estimator regression results are reported under Model 5 of Table 6
and under Model 5 of Table 7. The statistical tests (AR1, AR2, Hansen/Sargan tests)
conﬁrm the validity of our model and do support both the absence of second-order
serial correlation and the instruments’ validity. These results are also similar to those
reported in Model 1 of Table 6, implying that our results appear to be robust to
diﬀerent endogeneity problems.
Finally, a potential concern regarding our results so far is that risk disclosure diﬀerences
may be driven by bank ownership concentration or driven by banks operating in GCC
countries and non-GCC countres. To mitigate this concern, we classiﬁed the banks in
our sample into high (low) family ownership and GCC (non-GCC) sub-samples. The
(untabulated) results of these additional tests showed that ownership type and country-
level governance (GCC vs. non-GCC) moderate the MLG–risk disclosure nexus.
Overall, the additional analyses show that our ﬁndings are robust to potential endogeneity
problems, unobservable bank-speciﬁc factors, sub-samples, and alternative risk disclosure
measures.
7. Summary and conclusion
Although a number of past studies have examined the antecedents of corporate risk dis-
closures, a closer examination of this literature reveals several limitations. First and despite
the pivotal roles of ﬁnancial institutions to the smooth functioning of the global economy,
such studies have largely concentrated non-ﬁnancial corporations to the neglect of
ﬁnancial ones, such as banks. Second and although past studies have demonstrated that
several corporate decisions, such as disclosure are mainly a function of corporate
boards, managers and owners, a large number of the existing studies have surprisingly
been largely descriptive in orientation with limited/no theoretical underpinning, and
often simply investigating how traditional ﬁrm-level characteristics, such as ﬁrm size
and industry aﬀect the extent of corporate risk disclosures. Third, a few of the existing
risk disclosure studies have admittedly examined the role of governance in the extent of
corporate risk disclosures. However, such studies have mainly focused on examining
how individual governance measures (especially) at the ﬁrm-level can impact on the
extent of corporate risk disclosures primarily using samples of ﬁrms from single countries.
By contrast, studies examining how and why a layer of multiple governance mechanisms,
especially country-level governance structures may explain observable diﬀerences in the
levels of risk disclosures observed across diﬀerent ﬁrms in diﬀerent countries are rare.
Fourth and of closer relevance to our current study, the existing risk disclosure studies
have been conducted primarily in the developed economies in America and Europe to
the neglect of emerging, but equally important ones in Africa, Asia and the Middle
East. These limitations arguably impair a complete understanding of the drivers of corpor-
ate risk disclosures, especially in emerging economies, such as those in the MENA region.
Against this background, this study has sought to extend, as well as make a number of
new contributions to the extant literature by examining the impact of banks’ multi-layer
governance structures on their risk disclosures using a sample of banks from 14 countries
in the MENA region over the 2006–2013 period. Our key ﬁndings are as follows. First, our
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multivariate analysis results suggest that our MLG is signiﬁcant in explaining diﬀerences
in risk disclosure levels. Speciﬁcally, our results suggest that the presence of a Sharia
Supervisory Board (SSB) is positively associated with the level of risk disclosure by
banks. Secondly, at the bank-level, we ﬁnd that ownership structure (governmental own-
ership and family ownership) has a positive eﬀect on the level of risk disclosures by banks.
At the country-level, our evidence suggests that control of corruption has a positive eﬀect
on the level of bank risk disclosure, whilst political stability and the absence of violence
have a negative, but insigniﬁcant association with the level of bank risk disclosures. Col-
lectively, these results suggest that strong governance arrangement at both country-level
and bank-level can help in improving bank ﬁnancial reporting quality in terms of risk dis-
closure. These results also provide empirical support for the predictions of the resource
dependence theory perspective. Speciﬁcally, the resource dependence perspective
(Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, & Withers, 2015) suggests that the role
of MLG is to secure critical resources by encouraging banks to actively engage in risk dis-
closures, and thus, to decrease market uncertainty and dependence. Overall, our study is,
therefore, a major departure from much of the existing accounting literature that oﬀers
new crucial insights that show that ﬁrms’ disclosure choices are not mainly shaped by
ﬁrm-level (internal) governance arrangements, but also country-level (external) govern-
ance and religious factors.
In particular, our paper highlights the role of the multi-layer governance mechanisms
in encouraging bank ﬁnancial reporting quality in terms of risk disclosure. In doing so, our
study extends, as well as contributes to the extant research. First and drawing intuitions
from a resource dependence theory perspective, we provide an evidence relating to the
positive inﬂuence of SSB on the level of risk disclosure by banks. Previous research
suggests that Sharia boards play a signiﬁcant role in monitoring bank’s ﬁnancial reporting
quality (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Saﬁeddine, 2009). We expand this
nascent research by oﬀering evidence that SSB can serve as an additional governance layer
with ability to thoroughly monitor and scrutinise managerial decisions, including those
relating to disclosures. We argue that by highlighting the monitoring, performance and
value maximising roles of SSB within MENA banks, our ﬁnding may help inform the
decisions of the various stakeholders of banks, such as employees, depositors, investors,
government and regulators. Second, our ﬁndings show that ownership structures consti-
tute an important channel through which corporate governance may inﬂuence risk dis-
closure level, and thereby helping in identifying clear mechanisms and motives (e.g.
gaining access to critical resources) through which corporate governance may inﬂuence
bank risk disclosure level. Third, and to the best of our knowledge, our study oﬀers a
fresh evidence on the eﬀect of country-level factors on the level of risk disclosure. This
result may potentially help investors and regulators to better understand and/or evaluate
the channels (e.g. the legitimacy and regulatory setting) through which macro-level
factors, such as country-level governance can aﬀect disclosure level or/and quality, trans-
parency, and accountability within MENA banks. Fourth, our paper contributes to the
strand of literature that had called for the exploration of risk disclosure motives and
drivers across countries (e.g. Dobler, 2008). The prior cross-national literature on risk dis-
closure and governance (e.g. Elshandidy & Neri, 2015) highlights the signiﬁcance of the
principal variations in economic and cultural environments when examining variables
that aﬀect accounting practices. The existing evidence on the determinants of, and the
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motives for, cross-country risk disclosures (Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011; Elshandidy &
Neri, 2015) emphasises the signiﬁcance of observing variances in risk disclosure practices
and examining the speciﬁc variables that can explain such diﬀerences. None of the existing
studies (Dobler et al., 2011; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015) have, however, examined how cor-
porate governance mechanisms aﬀect risk disclosure practices in developing countries.
Finally, we seek to extend the existing literature by examining whether the eﬀect of the
multi-layer governance mechanisms on risk disclosure is driven by bank ownership con-
centration type in MENA countries.
This study has a number of implications for policymakers, regulators, practitioners and
investors, as well as IBs, CBs and DBs, especially for banks and authorities in other emer-
ging markets. Firstly, the results show that the banking sector has responded to the recent
regulatory pressures to enhance disclosure, transparency, and governance. Thus, these
results support the importance of risk disclosure regulation for management, policy-
makers, and regulators in the banking sector, especially after GFC. Secondly, the
ﬁndings demonstrate the importance of current CG reforms in MENA banks and their
impact on enhancing risk disclosures. Examples of such changes include: employing inde-
pendent chairpersons; increasing board size; and independent members acting as eﬀective
bank level advisors and monitors of risk disclosure. As a consequence, regulators and pol-
icymakers should continually pursue reforms that has to potential to encourage banks to
follow CG principles that are promoted as good practice. Thirdly, for IBs and DBs, the
results demonstrate the importance of SSB, which works with BODs as additional govern-
ance layers to enhance transparency through comprehensive risk disclosures. Finally, for
policymakers, regulators and investors, our country-level governance results support the
importance of sound governance institutions, such as control of corruption in enhancing
a banks’ transparency through risk disclosures.
This research suﬀers from some limitations. This study depends on banks annual
reports only, and although important, they are not the only means by which banks disclose
information about risk. Future research could examine the economic consequences of risk
disclosure from an equity and debt investors’ perspective, as well as its impact on bank
performance and value. Second, valuable insights might be oﬀered by future studies by
performing in-depth interviews with bank managers, directors and owners regarding
these issues, especially in Islamic banks. Third, further research can address sample size
limitations and the impact of further CGmechanism (e.g. audit committee, risk committee
and independence non-executive board members) on risk disclosure quality. Further
empirical research could explore our multi-layer governance analysis of the complex
inter-relationships between ﬁrm- and country-level governance structures in determining
ﬁrm value.
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Appendices
Appendix A1. The main corporate governance codes/guidelines changes in MENA countries.
Country Code type Issuing Entity Compliance
First
code
Latest
update
Algeria General corporate governance
code
Corporate governance task
force
V 2009 NA
Bahrain General corporate governance
code
Ministry of Industry, Commerce
and Tourism
C 2010 2018
Corporate governance for ﬁnancial
institutions
Central bank C 2018 NA
Egypt Code for listed companies Corporate governance task
force
C 2005 2016
Code for stated owned enterprises Corporate governance task
force
V 2006 –
Code for banks Central bank C 2011 –
Iraq No NA NA NA NA
Jordan Code for banks Central bank M 2007 2016
Code for listed companies Jordan securities commission C 2007 2017
Code for insurance companies Jordanian insurance
commission
M 2006 –
Kuwait Code for listed companies Capital markets authority C 2013
Guidelines for banks Central bank V 2012 2016
Lebanon Code for joint stock companies Lebanese transparency
association
V 2006 –
Guidelines for listed companies Lebanese transparency
association
V 2010 –
Code for small and medium-size
enterprises
Lebanese transparency
association
V 2010 –
Guidelines for banks Basel committee on banking
supervision
M 2006 2015
(Continued )
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Appendix A1. Continued.
Country Code type Issuing Entity Compliance
First
code
Latest
update
Morocco General corporate governance
code
National corporate governance
commission
C 2008 2018
Code for listed companies National corporate governance
commission
C 2011 –
Code for small and medium-size
enterprises
National corporate governance
commission
C 2008 2010
Code for banks/credit institutions Central bank M 2010 2016
Oman Code for listed companies Capital market authority M 2002 2015
Guidelines for banks Central bank M 2016 –
Palestine Code for listed companies Corporate governance
taskforce
M 2009 –
Qatar Code for public and listed Qatar ﬁnancial markets
authority
C 2009 2016
Code for banks and ﬁnancial
institutions
Qatar central bank C 2008 2015
Saudi
Arabia
Regulations for listed companies Capital market authority M 2006 2018
Principles of corporate governance
for banks
Saudi Arabian Monetary
Agency
M 2014 –
Syria Code for joint stock companies Capital market authority M 2008 –
Code for ﬁnancial intermediaries Central bank of Syria M 2009 –
Corporate governance act for
insurance companies
Syrian insurance supervisory
commission
M 2007 –
Tunisia Code of best practice of corporate
governance
Corporate governance institute V 2008 –
Guidelines for banks and credit
institutions
Central bank M 2011 –
Code for banks Central bank V 2013 –
UAE Code for banks Central bank M 2006 2010
Code for listed companies Securities and commodities
authority
M 2007 2016
Code for SMEs Dubai SME V 2011 –
Code for real estate developers Real estate regulatory agency C 2012 –
Code for joint stock companies Securities and commodities
authority
M 2007 2009
Yemen Code for listed companies Corporate governance
taskforce
V 2010 –
Notes: C = Comply or Explain, M =Mandatory, V = Voluntary.
Source: Amico (2014), IFC, central banks and capital markets authorities’ websites.
Appendix A2. Risk disclosure index.
Risk type Risk disclosure index (RDI)
Bank ﬁnancial risk disclosure
(i) Credit 1. Exposure to credit risk and how they arise.
2. Objectives, policies and processes for managing the credit risk.
3. Method of measuring credit risk exposure.
4. Adequately describes how credit risk management occurs including providing a clear linkage
between the quantitative data and qualitative description.
5. Changes in exposure to credit risk, measurement of risk, and objectives, policies and processes to
manage the credit risk from the previous period.
6. Amount of regulatory capital for credit risk (pillar 1 capital).
7. Information about credit quality of ﬁnancial assets that are not past due or impaired.
8. Renegotiated ﬁnancial assets (that would be past due or impaired).
9. Aging schedule for past due amounts.
10. Impairment methods and inputs disclosed.
11. Summary quantitative data about exposure to credit risk at the reporting date.
12. Maximum credit exposure by currency.
13. Maximum credit exposure by geography.
14. Maximum credit exposure by economic activity.
(Continued )
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Appendix A2. Continued.
Risk type Risk disclosure index (RDI)
15. Disaggregated maximum credit risk exposure including derivatives and oﬀ-balance sheet items
(e.g. ﬁnancial guarantees, and contingent commitments).
16. Renegotiated loans for troubled borrowers.
17. Risk of counterparty.
18. Credit risk concentrations.
19. Derivatives.
20. Oﬀ-balance sheet and joint venture structures.
21. Credit risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.
22. Collateral.
23. Disclosures to help users understand credit risk.
(ii) Liquidity 24. Exposure to liquidity risk and how they arise.
25. Objectives, policies and processes for managing the liquidity risk.
26. Methods used to measure the liquidity risk.
27. Changes in exposure to liquidity risk, measurement of risk, and objectives, policies and processes to
manage the liquidity risk from the previous period.
28. Contractual undiscounted cash ﬂows.
29. Maturity analysis of non-derivative liabilities.
30. Maturity analysis of derivative liabilities.
31. Maturity analysis of oﬀ-balance sheet commitments and other ﬁnancial instruments without
contractually stipulated maturity (e.g. ﬁnancial guarantees, etc.).
32. Maturity analysis of ﬁnancial asset.
33. Expected maturity analysis.
34. Derivative and trading liabilities Treatment.
35. Liquidity risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.
36. Liquidity buﬀers sources and volume.
37. Sensitivity analysis.
38. Financing facilities.
39. Counterparty concentration proﬁle.
40. Disclosures to help users understand liquidity risk.
(iii) Market 41. Objectives, policies, processes, and Strategies of market risk management.
42. Structure and organisation of the market risk management function.
43. Instruments traded types.
44. Interest rate risk.
45. Equity risk.
46. Currency risk.
47. Commodities risk
48. Market risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.
49. Linkage with credit risk.
50. Amount of regulatory capital for market risk (pillar 1 capital).
51. VAR (value-at-risk).
52. VAR limitations.
53. Stress testing.
54. Stress VAR.
55. Back-testing.
56. Disclosures to help users understand market risk.
(iv) Capital 57. Capital management.
58. Capital measurement.
59. Risk weighted assets.
60. Tier 1.
61. Tier 2.
Bank non-ﬁnancial risk disclosure
(v)
Operational
62. Amount of regulatory capital for operational risk (pillar 1 capital).
63. Regulatory capital for operational risk Measurement approach.
64. Operational risk management Strategies and processes.
65. The operational risk management function structure and organisation.
66. Scope and nature of the operational risk reporting system
67. Operational risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques.
(Continued )
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Appendix A2. Continued.
Risk type Risk disclosure index (RDI)
68. Operational value-at-risk.
69. Internal audit function/internal control system.
70. Key risk indicators (KRIs)/early warning systems (EWSs).
71. Self-assessment techniques (SA).
72. Stress tests/ Scorecard models/scenario analyses.
73. Operational risk event databases (internal/external).
74. Legal risks.
75. Additional information on risk exposure and management (e.g. cumulative amounts of historical
operational losses classiﬁed by event types and business).
76. Technology/information technology.
77. Compliance.
78. Marketing/customer satisfaction/boycott.
79. Competition/proprietary/copyright.
80. Personnel (human error, labour disputes, loss of/recruiting key employees).
81. Integrity/management and employee fraud.
82. Business ethics/corruption.
83. Disclosures to help users understand operational risk.
(vi) Strategic 84. Sovereign/politics.
85. Performance measurement.
86. Regulation.
87. Taxation.
88. Macroeconomic trends.
89. Natural disasters/terrorism.
90. GDP growth/market demand/aggregate demand.
91. Intellectual property rights.
92. New alliances, joint ventures and acquisitions.
93. Management of growth.
94. Reputation/goodwill/image/brand name.
95. Strategy.
96. Disclosures to help users understand strategic risk.
Total 96 risk disclosure items
Procedure of scoring for un-weighted index
0: Risk item not disclosed by bank.
1: Risk item disclosed by bank.
Procedure of scoring for weighted index
0: Risk item not disclosed by bank.
1: Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad and/or qualitative information.
2: Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad, qualitative and/or quantitative information.
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